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1Abstract
While people with disabilities often say that a loss of 
public health insurance is a deterrent to work, it is 
rare to find situations in which they might actually 
exhibit such a behavioral response to a change in 
access. Expansions in the income threshold for SSI 
work incentives program (Sections 1619(a) and (b)) 
provide an opportunity to observe such a response. 
Section 1619(b) allows SSI recipients to maintain Med-
icaid eligibility even if their income is above the level 
that makes them ineligible for SSI payments. If earn-
ings increase beyond the 1619(b) threshold, however, 
the person loses their SSI and Medicaid eligibility. 
Section 1619(b) income thresholds vary significantly 
across states and over time. 
Stapleton and Tucker (2000) use the variation in Section 
1619(b) income thresholds to examine the employment, 
earnings and program participation patterns of SSI 
recipients who have incomes near the threshold level 
for their state. They find strong evidence that many SSI 
recipients restrain their earnings to stay below the 1619(b) 
threshold. It is important to note, however, that the 
findings only provide evidence on the behavior of a 
small portion of the population with disabilities (i.e., 
SSI recipients who work). Nonetheless, this evidence 
seems to provide strong empirical support for the hypo-
thesis that lack of access to health insurance is an 
important work disincentive for people with disabilities.
They also find that 1619(b) participation varies sig-
nificantly from month to month. Consequently, cross-
sectional estimates on the share of SSI recipients partic-
ipating in 1619(b) significantly understate the share of 
SSI recipients who ever participate. These findings are 
consistent with previous findings that cross-sectional 
estimates of employment tend to understate multi-period 
employment patterns for the broader population with 
disabilities. 
Introduction
A significant portion of people with disabilities receive 
access to public health insurance from Medicaid and/or 
Medicare by participating in the Supplementary Secu-
rity Income (SSI) and/or Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DI) programs. Surveys of SSI and DI partici-
pants often indicate that the potential loss of health 
insurance benefits is a significant deterrent to increas-
ing their earnings. Recipients often, however, also cite 
other deterrents (e.g., transportation). Hence, many are 
skeptical that expansion of access to health insurance 
would have much of an impact on work outcomes.
While people with disabilities often say that a loss of 
public health insurance is a deterrent to work, it is 
rare to find situations in which they might actually 
exhibit a behavioral response to a change in access. 
Expansions in the income threshold for SSI work incen-
tives program (Sections 1619(a) and (b)) provides an 
opportunity to observe such behavior. Section 1619(b) 
allows SSI recipients to maintain Medicaid eligibility 
even if their income is above the level that makes them 
ineligible for SSI payments. If earnings increase beyond 
the 1619(b) threshold, however, the person loses their 
SSI and Medicaid eligibility. 
This brief summarizes the findings of Stapleton and 
Tucker (2000), who examined the effect that changes 
in the Section 1619(b) income thresholds have on the 
employment, earnings, and program participation pat-
terns of SSI recipients.1 In addition, they examined 
variation in 1619(b) participation over time, to deter-
mine if cross-sectional estimates understate the number 
of SSI recipients who ever participate in 1619(b). 
SSI Work Incentives
Under Section 1619 of the Social Security Act, SSI recipi-
ents who have earnings may still be SSI and Medicaid 
eligible when their earnings exceed the “substantial 
gainful activity level” (SGA), which was $500 in 1996.2 
To illustrate how the program works, Stapleton and 
Tucker present an example of the relationship between 
earnings and SSI and Medicaid benefits for a non-married 
individual living in Pennsylvania in 1996 (Exhibit 1). 
For simplicity, they assume that the SSI recipient has 
no non-labor income other than SSI, and no deductible 
income related work expenses (IRWEs).3 A disabled SSI 
1More details of the study can be found in Stapleton et al. (1998). 
The research was funded by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planing and 
Evaluation
2 In 1999, SGA was increased from $500 to $700.
3Many SSI recipients do have some non-labor income; a signifi-
cant share qualify for a DI benefit that is below the SSI maxi-
mum payment. This non-labor income reduces the SSI breakeven 
earnings level. Although it does not affect the 1619(b) income 
threshold, it does affect the level of earnings associated with 
the income threshold. In addition, many working SSI recipients 
also have Income Related Work Expenses (IRWEs). The 1619(b) 
income threshold and associated earnings level are increased 
dollar for dollar by IRWEs. Stapleton and Tucker’s methodology 
focuses on the expansion of the 1619(b) threshold, holding other 
things constant, including IRWE.
24 The $85 in the example includes $20 that applies to any income 
and $65 that applies to only earned income.
5 The inflation rate (as measured by the Consumer Price Index) 
increased by 20 percent between 1990 and 1996.
recipient with no earnings would receive $497 in SSI 
cash payments ($470 federal payment and $27.40 state 
supplement) and, on average, $509 in in-kind Medicaid 
benefits, for a total of $1,006 in net benefits per month. 
The SSI benefit calculation disregards an individual’s 
first $85 of earned income per month.4  Beyond the dis-
regard, SSI recipients lose 50 cents for each additional 
dollar earned. Once a recipient earns SGA ($500), he 
or she is no longer eligible for regular SSI, and must 
transfer to section 1619(a) to maintain SSI eligibility. 
Section 1619(a) eligibility allows recipients to increase 
their monthly earnings above SGA without completely 
losing their SSI cash payments; recipients continue to 
lose 50 cents in benefits for each additional dollar 
of earnings until his or her benefits have fallen to 
zero. The illustrative recipient would lose all SSI cash 
benefits and transfer to section 1619(b) eligibility once 
his or her monthly earnings reached $1,080, Pennsylva-
nia’s SSI “breakeven point” in 1996. Section 1619(b) 
eligibility allows the recipient to increase monthly earn-
ings above the breakeven point without losing his 
or her Medicaid benefit or continuing eligibility for 
SSI. Eligibility under section 1619(b) continues until 
an individual’s monthly earnings reach a “threshold 
amount,” beyond which a person loses both Medicaid 
eligibility and continuing eligibility. This amount is 
equal to the state’s SSI breakeven point plus the aver-
age Medicaid expenditures for disabled SSI cash recipi-
ents in the state—$509 in Pennsylvania in 1996. Thus, 
the illustrative recipient’s threshold amount is $1,589.
Rapid growth in average Medicaid expenditures for dis-
abled SSI recipients has resulted in substantial expan-
sion of the 1619(b) earnings threshold amount in each 
state since 1990. For a recipient with only the mini-
mum disregards (such as the recipient in the example 
above), the median state 1619(b) threshold increased 
from $15,016 in 1990 to $19,455 in 1996. This repre-
sents a 19.6 percent increase over the period, or an 
annual rate of 4.3 percent.5 There was significant varia-
tion in the growth of these thresholds across states. For 
example, from 1990 to 1996, in Maine the threshold 
increased by $7,881 (from $14,300 to 22,181), whereas 
in Washington, the threshold declined by $7,711 (from 
$25,554 to 17,843). 
Exhibit 1
Earnings and Benefits for a Non-Married SSI Recipient Living in Pennsylvania in 1996
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3Methodology
Stapleton and Tucker predict that while most SSI recipi-
ents will be unaffected by an increase in the 1619(b) 
threshold because they do not work, those closest to 
the threshold might restrain their earnings to maintain 
their SSI and Medicaid eligibility. Consequently, all else 
equal, SSI recipients closest to the threshold will likely 
have a stronger behavioral response to an increase 
than other recipients, including workers with earnings 
well below the threshold. 
Stapleton and Tucker use Social Security Administra-
tive (SSA) data on SSI recipients to examine Section 
1619(b) participation from 1990 to 1996 in two ways. 
First, they use the variation in Section 1619(b) thresh-
olds across states and over time to analyze the effects 
that threshold increases have of earnings, SSI income, 
and SSI participation. They create a study group of 
adult (under age 50) SSI recipients who had SSA earn-
ings records in 1990.6 The “full study group” includes 
individuals whose chargeable incomes are within 50 
percent of the state threshold.7 Within the full study 
group, they also analyze four subgroups of SSI recipi-
ents defined by how close their 1990 incomes are to 
the threshold (Top 5%, Next 5%, Next 15%, and Next 
25%). They expect the effects of threshold changes 
to be strongest for those with 1990 incomes closest 
to the threshold, because these are the individuals 
whose earnings are most likely to be constrained by 
the threshold. In the second part, they examine varia-
tion in 1619(b) participation over time to determine if 
cross-sectional estimates understate the number of SSI 
recipients who ever participate in 1619(b).
Effect of Threshold Increases on 
Employment, Earnings, and Program 
Participation
Overall, Stapleton and Tucker find very strong evi-
dence that some SSI recipients who work substantially 
restrain their Social Security earnings to stay below 
the 1619(b) threshold (Exhibit 2). Based on analysis 
of data for 1990-91 only, they estimate that a $1,000 
increase in the threshold increased mean earnings for 
those in the full study group by approximately $300.8  
As expected, they also find that the effects for the study 
groups closer to the threshold are even larger than 
those in the full study group. For SSI recipients whose 
chargeable income is closest to the threshold (Top 
5%), they find that a $1,000 change in threshold over 
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Exhibit 2
Average Estimated Effects of a $1,000 Increase in the 1619(b) 
Threshold on Social Security Earnings, 1990-91
Study Groups
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6 In 1990, only 4.1 percent of adult SSI recipients had SSA 
earnings.
7 Stapleton and Tucker use SSI recipients whose earnings were 
below 50 percent of the threshold as a control group. 
8 The point estimates for the full study group range from $117 to 
$482. It is difficult to know whether the “true” effect is near the 
bottom or top of the range indicated, but the midpoint, $300, is a 
credible value.
4this period increased means earnings by approximately 
$650.9 Results for changes in earnings from 1990 to 
1996 are weaker, but still consistent with predictions.10 
Stapleton and Tucker also find strong evidence that 
recipients significantly reduce reported earnings to stay 
below the threshold when their chargeable unearned 
income increases. 
The findings are also generally consistent with hypoth-
eses regarding the impact of threshold changes on 
employment and SSI participation. They find some 
small reductions in SSI payments to those most likely 
to be restraining earnings. They also find evidence 
that increases in chargeable unearned income reduce 
scheduled SSI payments of those whose initial earnings 
are closest to the threshold by less than statutory 
requirements, because of induced reductions in earn-
ings. They do not find evidence of effect on either 
employment or SSI participation. It appears that recip-
ients make marginal adjustments to their earnings 
because of threshold and unearned income changes, 
rather than wholesale changes to their participation or 
employment status.
Longitudinal 1619(b) Participation
Stapleton and Tucker also examine longitudinal pat-
terns in 1619(b) participation to determine whether 
cross-section statistics understate the share of SSI recip-
ients in 1619(b) within a particular month. It is pos-
sible, for example, that significant shares of SSI recipi-
ents are only in 1619(b) temporarily because of unsta-
ble monthly earnings patterns and/or part-time labor 
force attachment. This would be consistent with find-
ings that cross-sectional statistics understate employ-
ment for the broader population with disabilities 
(Burkhauser and Wittenburg, 1996).
They find high monthly variability in 1619(b) participa-
tion. While only 33,000 of the roughly 128,000 SSI 
recipients with earnings in 1990 (26 percent) participated 
in 1619(b) for at least one month in 1990, almost 57 
thousand (44 percent) participated in 1619(b) for at least 
one month during the entire 1990-96 period. The latter 
number is about 2.4 times the number of SSI recipients 
reported by SSA as participating in the program in 
December 1990. Stapleton and Tucker conclude that 
cross-sectional statistics on the share of SSI recipients 
participating in 1619(b) are much lower than the share 
of SSI recipients who ever participate, reflecting high 
variation in who participates from month to month. 
Summary
The findings provide substantial support for the hypo-
thesis that lack of access to health insurance is an 
important work disincentive for people with disabilities. 
Currently, several states are expanding Medicaid cover-
age for people with disabilities, mainly by introducing 
options that were allowed under the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act. The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives 
Improvement Act (TWWIIA) of 1999 included provi-
sions to encourage states to further expand Medicaid 
coverage for people with disabilities. TWWIIA also 
expanded Medicare options for Social Security Dis-
ability beneficiaries who work. Based on the findings 
for 1619(b), these recent policy changes could have a 
large impact on employment outcomes for people with 
disabilities. One major caveat, however, is that the 
finding above only directly apply to a select group of 
SSI disability recipients who work. Hence, it is difficult 
to say how large the impacts of the current expansions 
will be.11 
The findings also indicate that there is high monthly 
variability in 1619(b) participation. This finding under-
scores the importance of examining the dynamics of 
employment and program participation for people with 
disabilities. 
9 The point estimates for the Top 5% group range from $272 
to $1,025. It is difficult to know whether the “true” effect is 
near the bottom or top of the range indicated, but as above, the 
midpoint, $650, is a credible value.
10 The point estimates for the full study group range from $37 to 
$233. The weaker results for this period appear to reflect strong 
negative earnings trends for the recipients in the sample. These 
trends occur despite substantial overall growth of the economy 
during the period. It seems likely that deterioration in health condi-
tions is a common explanation of earnings declines, and the weaker 
results may simply reflect the fact that the number in the sample for 
whom the threshold is relevant declines over time.
11The methodological approach to evaluate the impact of the 
1619(b) expansions might also have some applicability to future 
evaluations of the impact of the recent Medicaid expansions on 
the employment patterns of SSI (and former SSI) recipients. For 
example, researchers might analyze the impact of these expan-
sions by comparing the experiences of a cohort of SSI recipients 
affected by these changes to the experiences of another cohort 
whom are not affected.
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